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FIRST AMENDMENT AS LAST RESORT: THE INTERNET 
GAMBLING INDUSTRY’S BID TO ADVERTISE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Gambling is a business the Internet serves well.  Web sites like 
BETonSPORTS.com and PartyPoker.com provide almost unlimited access to 
betting and gambling.1  These Web sites and many others like them are 
operated from a variety of jurisdictions including Costa Rica, Britain, and 
countries in the Caribbean.2  Although Internet gambling has existed for 
approximately ten years, many countries continue to struggle to apply 
traditional gaming laws to a medium whose jurisdictional issues challenge 
enforceability.3 
In the United States, gambling is mostly left to the states to regulate or 
prohibit.4  However, some methods of gambling, such as placing a bet via 
telephone, can involve interstate commerce if the bet is transmitted across state 
lines.5  Congress has therefore enacted some federal gambling provisions.  
Those laws, however, provide somewhat of an awkward fit to Internet 
gambling.6  For example, the Wire Act—enacted to combat betting rings led 
by organized crime—forbids transmission of a bet or wager across state lines.7  
In a Fifth Circuit case, the Wire Act was interpreted as only applicable to 
 
 1. Online Gamblers Bet on Industry, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2004, at 12 (quoting the CEO of 
BETonSPORTS.com, David Carruthers, as saying: “[T]here are millions of Americans wagering 
every day.”); Peter Gumbel, How the U.S. Is Getting Beat in Online Gambling, TIME, Nov. 28, 
2005, at A1 (special section).  It is estimated that there are 12 million online gamblers worldwide, 
and that 5.3 million of them are American.  Susan Ormand, Pending U.S. Legislation to Prohibit 
Offshore Internet Gambling May Proliferate Money Laundering, 10 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 447, 
448 (2004).  “Internet gambling” will hereinafter refer to both gambling and sports betting on the 
Internet.  “Operators” will refer to the people who operate gambling Web sites. 
 2. Matt Richtel, Gambling Sites Offering Ways to Let Any User Be the Bookie, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 6, 2004, at C1.  Approximately seventy-five jurisdictions in the world allow operation of 
Internet gambling Web sites.  Sue Schneider, The Market—An Introduction, in INTERNET 
GAMBLING REPORT 51 (Mark Balestra & Anthony Cabot eds., 7th ed. 2004). 
 3. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE ISSUES 6, 45 (2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 4. Id. at 12. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., GAMING LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 563 (2003). 
 7. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000). 
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sports betting.8  That decision leaves casino games, such as poker, blackjack, 
and slots, which are popular on the Internet, in a gray area.9  Various bills have 
been introduced in Congress to attempt to update federal gambling laws for the 
Internet, but none has passed both houses.10 
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), however, maintains that current 
federal gambling law does apply to Internet gambling and in fact makes it 
illegal.11  In a letter dated June 11, 2003, the DOJ informed the National 
Association of Broadcasters (NAB) that “[w]ith very few exceptions limited to 
licensed sportsbook operations in Nevada, state and federal laws prohibit the 
operation of sportsbooks and Internet gambling within the United States, 
whether or not such operations are based offshore.”12  Noting that 
advertisements for Internet gambling are “ubiquitous on the Internet, in print 
ads, and over the radio and television,” the DOJ asked the association to warn 
its members that should they accept money from Internet gambling operators, 
they would be aiding and abetting an illegal activity and would be punishable 
as a principal violator under 18 U.S.C § 2.13  The DOJ noted that U.S. 
attorneys general have successfully prosecuted Internet gambling operations 
and “will continue to pursue such cases.”14 
 
 8. In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 480 (2001). 
 9. See Pat King, Legal Issues Still Unclear on ‘Net Gaming, LAS VEGAS BUS. PRESS, Oct. 
22, 2001, at 3B. 
 10. Stevie Watson et al., The Legalization of Internet Gambling: A Consumer Protection 
Perspective, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 209, 210 (2004).  The Internet Gambling 
Prohibition Act (IGPA) of 1997 was an effort to make Internet gambling illegal under the Wire 
Act.  Id.  The bill was not passed, but it was reintroduced in 1999, when it passed the Senate but 
not the House of Representatives.  Id.  In 2001, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding 
Prohibition Act (UIGFPA) was introduced; this Act made it a crime for U.S. financial institutions 
to do business with the Internet gambling industry.  Id.  This bill was passed in 2002 and 2003 by 
the House, but did not get Senate support.  Id.  A companion bill to the UIGFPA, the Combating 
Illegal Gambling Reform and Modernization Act (CIGRMA), would amend the Wire Act to 
make online gambling illegal.  Thomas James Friedrich, Comment, Internet Casino Gambling: 
The Nightmare of Lawmaking, Jurisdiction, Enforcement & the Dangers of Prohibition 11 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 369, 375 (2003).  This bill passed the House Judiciary Committee in 
2002, but was later “brought down by the conflicts of special interests.”  Id. at 379–80. 
 11. Letter from John G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to the National Ass’n of Broadcasters (June 11, 2003), available at 
http://ww2.casinocitypress.com/ExhibitAtoComplaint.pdf [hereinafter NAB Letter].  The DOJ 
stated that operators of betting and casino Web sites that accept U.S. customers violate 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1084 (the Wire Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the Travel Act), and 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (the Organized 
Crime Control Act).  NAB Letter, supra. 
 12. NAB Letter, supra note 11. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  As of 1999, the DOJ had brought charges against twenty-two Internet gambling 
operators for violation of the Wire Act.  NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION, 
FINAL REPORT 5-9 (1999), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/5.pdf 
[hereinafter NGISC REPORT].  Former Attorney General Janet Reno has said, “The Internet is not 
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Subsequent to sending its advertising warning, the DOJ took steps to curb 
Internet gambling advertising.15  Prosecutors have convened grand juries to 
inquire about the broadcast of such advertising, and most major American 
broadcasters and online media, including Clear Channel Communications, 
Infinity Broadcasting, Discovery Networks, Yahoo!, and Google, have stopped 
carrying the advertisements.16  This tactic is quite telling about the nature of 
the Internet gambling industry.17  Safely situated offshore, operators may avoid 
U.S. law while raking in billions of U.S. dollars per year.18  The popularity of 
Internet gambling, especially sports betting and poker, continues to grow.19  
The DOJ’s response seems to be that if it can’t prosecute operators directly, it 
may go after those they do business with in the United States.20 
 
an electronic sanctuary for illegal betting.  To Internet betting operators everywhere, we have a 
simple message: ‘You can’t hide online and you can’t hide offshore.’”  Id. at 5-10 (citing 
Benjamin Weiser, 14 Facing Charges in First U.S. Action on Internet Betting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
5, 1998, at A1.  At least one of the operators charged, Jay Cohen, was convicted and sentenced to 
twenty-one months in prison for his Internet gambling offense.  Matt Richtel, An Industry That 
Dares Not Meet in the Country of Its Best Customers, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at C4. 
 15. See Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Authorities Seize Advertising Funds for Overseas Online 
Casinos, 20 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 353, 354 (Aug. 2004). 
 16. Id.; Matt Richtel, Lawsuit Claims Free Speech for Online Casino Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
23, 2004, at C3; see also Liz Benston, Online Casinos Continue Marketing Push, IN BUS. LAS 
VEGAS, Dec. 17, 2004, at 15.  On September 24, 2004, the former owner of three St. Louis sports 
radio stations agreed to pay $159,000 to settle a criminal investigation by the U.S. Attorney for 
the Eastern District of Missouri about the stations’ advertising of sportsbooks.  Peter Shinkle, 
KFNS Settles with Government over Betting Ads, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 25, 2004, at 
19.  Similarly, the Sporting News agreed to pay $7.2 million to settle federal claims regarding 
advertisements for Internet gambling.  Peter Shinkle, Sporting News Will Pay $7.2 Million over 
Online Gambling Ads, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 21, 2006, at A6 [hereinafter Shinkle, 
Sporting News]. 
 17. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-10 (stating that the international nature of the online 
gambling business assists its “ability to circumvent regulations”); Watson et al., supra note 10, at 
210 (“[T]he borderless, global nature of the Internet makes enforcement problematic, especially 
with providers in countries in which Internet gambling is legal.”). 
 18. Estimates of Internet gambling revenue vary.  In 2004, Christiansen Capital Advisors 
estimated that global Internet gambling revenue was $7.4 billion.  Anthony Cabot, Traditional 
Versus Internet Gambling, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 2, at 33, 44. 
 19. In 2001, estimated global revenues in U.S. dollars for Internet gambling were $3 billion; 
in 2002, $4 billion; in 2003, $5.7 billion.  Id.  In 2005 the estimated revenue was $9.9 billion.  Id.  
This growth resembles consumers’ overall increased spending on “land-based” (non-Internet) 
gambling.  Between 1982 and 1996, consumer spending on legal gambling grew at an average 
annual rate of 11.4 percent.  Eugene Martin Christiansen, Gambling and the American Economy, 
556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 36, 40 (1998).  For the increased popularity of poker, 
see Schneider, supra note 2, at 53. 
 20. Shinkle, Sporting News, supra note 16 (quoting Roland Corvington, FBI agent in charge 
of the St. Louis District, as saying that enforcement of U.S. law against Internet gambling 
operators is aimed at companies that support them). 
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A. The Casino City Complaint 
Thus, increasingly cut off from a major way to market to Americans, the 
Internet gambling industry attempted to strike back with a complaint seeking a 
declaratory judgment against the DOJ on First Amendment grounds.21  The 
complaint was filed on August 9, 2004, by Casino City, Inc., a United States 
company, in U.S. District Court in the Middle District of Louisiana.22  Casino 
City maintains a portal Web site at www.casinocity.com, which offers 
information and news about both online and traditional land-based gambling.23  
According to its complaint, Casino City “disseminates information . . . such as 
interviews with professional gamblers, advice and expert columns, directories, 
playing strategies and tips, weekly news publications and news clips.”24  In its 
complaint, Casino City stated that the advertisements it accepts are neither 
misleading nor concern unlawful activity.25  The complaint stated that Casino 
City does not knowingly accept payment from proceeds of illegal gambling or 
wagers placed by people located in the United States.26  According to the 
complaint, the advertisements Casino City posts on its Web site are of the 
same content that the DOJ warned may constitute an aiding and abetting 
violation of various federal and state laws.27  Casino City cited the “numerous 
subpoenas” issued by the DOJ to media outlets relating to Internet gambling 
advertisements as well as the NAB letter as creating reasonable and imminent 
 
 21. Complaint at 2, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3 (M.D. La. 
Aug. 7, 2004), available at http://ww2.casinocitypress.com/ComplaintFiledon8-9-04.pdf 
[hereinafter Complaint].  “Corfman [the CEO of Casino City] isn’t taking on Justice single-
handed.”  Spencer E. Ante, High Stakes for Casino City, BUS. WK., Feb. 14, 2005, at 82, 82–83.  
Online gambling companies, including Sportingbet PLC, and trade associations are helping pay 
for the lawsuit.  Id. at 82; see also Richtel, supra note 16 (quoting gambling attorney Lawrence 
G. Walters as saying that this is a test case). 
 22. Complaint, supra note 21, at 1. 
 23. See Casino City, http://www.casinocity.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2006). 
 24. Complaint, supra note 21, at 3. 
 25. Id.  Under the test governing First Amendment protection for commercial speech, the 
activity advertised must be legal and not misleading.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 26. Complaint, supra note 21, at 3. 
Casino City does not conduct or participate in online casino or sports book activities.  
Casino City does not knowingly accept, in payment for running online casino or sports 
book advertisements, proceeds that come from illegal bets, deposits or wagers placed by 
persons located in the United States or anywhere world-wide, and the company has taken 
reasonable steps to ensure that such proceeds are not received. 
Id. 
 27. Id. at 4. 
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fear of prosecution “within the advertising community resulting in a chilling 
effect upon the exercise of free speech.”28 
B. The DOJ Moves to Dismiss, and Casino City Responds 
On October 29, 2004, the DOJ moved to dismiss Casino City’s 
complaint.29  The DOJ’s reply brief addressed two major issues.  The first issue 
was standing, which will not be discussed in this Comment.30  The second 
issue addressed by the DOJ concerned the First Amendment.  If Casino City is 
threatened with prosecution, the DOJ argued, it is because the conduct in 
question—Internet gambling—is illegal.31  The DOJ stated: “Casino City’s 
claim fails as a matter of law, for it is well-established that there is no First 
Amendment right to advertise illegal activity.”32  The DOJ then argued that it 
could satisfy the remaining prongs of the test for commercial free speech.33 
Casino City’s response to the DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss called the DOJ’s 
actions a “well orchestrated plan to unabashedly set out to stifle the free speech 
of an entire sector of the advertising industry.”34  Casino City argued that it 
was forced to engage in conduct that is “likely proscribed by the challenged 
restriction as interpreted by the DOJ,” or censor itself.35  Casino City stressed 
that its advertisements are available in every country, not just the United 
 
 28. Id. at 2–3.  “On information and belief, as a direct result of the DOJ threats, a number of 
internet advertising portals based in the United States have ceased to accept advertising of legal 
casino and sports betting.”  Id. 
 29. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3 
(M.D. La. Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/MotionToDismiss.pdf 
[hereinafter DOJ Motion to Dismiss]. 
 30. Id. at 7.  The DOJ argued that Casino City had no standing to bring this complaint.  Id. at 
7–9.  The DOJ alleged a contradiction in the complaint—that Casino City stated both that its 
advertisements are of the same type that violate U.S. law (as interpreted by the DOJ), and also 
that the advertisements concerned legal activity.  Id. at 16.  If Casino City is engaged in legal 
activity, the DOJ argued, it is in no danger of imminent prosecution.  Id.  On the other hand, if 
Casino City is engaged in illegal activity, there would be no basis for it to assert First Amendment 
protection, because only advertisements that contain speech about legal conduct are protected.  Id. 
at 17.  Further, the DOJ argued that there is no imminent threat of prosecution because more than 
one year has passed since the NAB Letter was sent, and Casino City received no correspondence 
from the DOJ.  Id. at 14. 
 31. Id. at 17–18. 
 32. Id. at 17 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
563–64 (1980)). 
 33. Id. at 19. 
 34. Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3 (M.D. La. Nov. 18, 2004), 
available at http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/MemoinResponsetoMotiontoDismiss.pdf 
[hereinafter Casino City Response]. 
 35. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
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States, and that many of its readers live in countries where Internet gambling is 
legal.36  Casino City’s response also reiterated that it could satisfy the test for 
commercial speech protection.37  After Casino City filed its response, the DOJ 
filed a Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.38 
C. Motion to Dismiss Granted, Appeals Follow 
The complaint was a risk for Casino City, but perhaps the Internet 
gambling industry felt it was worth a try, given that much advertising has 
already been blocked.39  If the court had given Casino City the declaratory 
judgment it sought, it would have been perceived as a win for the industry that 
could result in legitimization or perhaps even a step toward regulation in the 
United States.  Casino City lost its gamble on February 15, 2005, when the 
district court granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.40  In its 
ruling, the court also stated that Casino City did not have a valid First 
Amendment claim, because if it were prosecuted, it would be for illegal 
activities.41  This Comment will analyze Casino City’s First Amendment issue 
assuming the company had been found to have standing.  It is conceivable that 
this issue could come before a court again.  Further, due to precedent in the 
Fifth Circuit, it is conceivable that a court in the future could find a right to 
advertise Internet casinos but not Internet sports books.  Commercial speech 
doctrine under the First Amendment has been called a compromise between 
the rights of consumers to get information about products and the rights of the 
government to regulate the sale of products.42  In the case of gambling 
 
 36. Id. at 21–22 (“Casino City places advertisements . . . [that] are available for viewing by 
tens of millions of people making up the worldwide audience of the Internet, many of whom are 
located in countries where engaging in the conduct that is advertised is expressly legal.”). 
 37. Id. at 23–26.  For the test that the Supreme Court uses to determine whether commercial 
speech receives First Amendment protection, see infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 38. Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3 (M.D. La. Dec. 3, 
2004), available at http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/CasinoCityDOJreplybrief.pdf [hereinafter 
DOJ Reply].  On January 27, 2005, Casino City and the DOJ participated in a telephone status 
conference.  Minute Entry Order at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-
M3 (M.D. La. Jan. 27, 2005), available at http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/TelephoneStatus 
Conference27January2004.pdf. 
 39. Interview with Sue Schneider, Internet gambling industry consultant and former 
chairman of the Interactive Gaming Council, in St. Charles, Mo. (Oct. 28, 2004). 
 40. Ruling at 7, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-557-B-M3 (M.D. La. Feb. 
15, 2005), available at http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/DismissalRulingandOrder.pdf.  Casino 
City has appealed.  See Notice of Appeal at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-
557-B-M3 (M.D. La. Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://pdf.online.casinocity.com/ 
NoticeOfAppeal.pdf. 
 41. Ruling, supra note 40, at 13. 
 42. E.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (“The entire 
commercial speech doctrine, after all, represents an accommodation between the right to speak 
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advertisements, however, there is little information to be exchanged other than 
alerting consumers that gambling is available.43  Internet gambling is not going 
to go away, and perhaps the U.S. government could serve consumers better by 
strictly regulating it—and heavily taxing it—than trying to block 
advertisements for it.44  But the merits of regulating Internet gambling are a 
separate issue.  This Comment’s focus is on whether U.S. media companies 
have a constitutional right to advertise Internet gambling in the United States 
without incurring potential criminal liability. 
This Comment will first discuss the relevant First Amendment case law 
regarding commercial speech and the Internet.  It will then explore the First 
Amendment issue in the Casino City complaint via discussion of each element 
of the test used by the Supreme Court to determine whether a commercial 
speech restriction violates the First Amendment.45  As part of the discussion of 
each element of the commercial speech test, the Author will analyze how the 
court may have ruled on the free speech issue had it not dismissed the 
complaint for lack of standing. 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT CASE LAW 
A. Commercial Speech and Gambling 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall 
make no law “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”46  Many 
people view free speech as the most important right that Americans have.47  
 
and hear expression about goods and services and the right of government to regulate the sale of 
such goods and services.”). 
 43. Bruce Ledewitz, Corporate Advertising’s Democracy, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 421 
(2003).  Ledewitz states: 
Anyone who has ever seen or heard gambling advertising knows that by and large it 
contains no information.  Rather, the point of the advertising is to remind people that 
gambling is available, and the point of limiting advertising is to keep susceptible people 
from being reminded of the temptation to gamble.  Does a ban on gambling advertising 
then manipulate the flow of information, as supporters of commercial speech fear, or 
“manipulate” the flow of manipulation? 
Id. 
 44. For support of legalization and regulation of Internet gambling in the United States, see 
Adrian Parke & Mark Griffiths, Why Internet Gambling Prohibition Will Ultimately Fail, 8 
GAMING L. REV. 295, 298 (2004); R. Scott Girdwood, Place Your Bets . . . on the Keyboard: Are 
Internet Casinos Legal?, 25 CAMPBELL L. REV. 135, 148 (2002); Friedrich, supra note 10, at 
370. 
 45. For an explanation of elements of the test used by Supreme Court in commercial free 
speech cases, see infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 47. ROY L. MOORE ET AL., ADVERTISING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS LAW 14–15 (1998) 
(“[M]any believe almost all other interests are subservient to [free speech] . . . .”).  Another writer 
considers free speech essential for “individual liberty.” “The First Amendment protects a person’s 
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The executive and judicial branches are also forbidden from infringing on 
constitutionally protected speech.48  The Supreme Court’s commercial speech 
jurisprudence is an anomaly in First Amendment law, which for the most part 
does not allow speech to be distinguished solely based on content.49 
Commercial speech was given First Amendment protection for the first 
time in 1975 with Bigelow v. Virginia50 and the next year in Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council.51  The test for whether commercial free 
speech is protected was first put forth by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,52 a landmark 
case that came on the heels of the Pharmacy and Bigelow decisions.53  The 
standard of judicial review for commercial speech set forth in Central Hudson 
is the current standard.54 
In Central Hudson, the New York Public Service Commission had banned 
promotional advertising of the appellant utility company that had a monopoly 
in its service area.55  The commission wanted to discourage energy 
consumption.56  Justice Powell, writing for the majority, articulated the test for 
whether commercial speech is protected: 
[I]t must at least concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, we ask 
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both inquiries 
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more 
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.57 
 
use of speech to order and create the world in a desired way and as a tool for understanding and 
communicating about that world in ways he or she finds important.  These uses are fundamental 
aspects of individual liberty and choice.”  C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH 196 (1989). 
 48. EDWIN P. ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE 
SPEECH 3 (1985). 
 49. Id. at 4.  One reason commercial speech is granted less protection than other kinds of 
speech is that commercial speech is profit oriented.  BAKER, supra note 47, at 196.  According to 
Baker, commercial speech “lacks the crucial connections with individual liberty and self-
realization that are central to justifications for the constitutional protection of speech, 
justifications that in turn define the proper scope of protection under the first amendment.”  Id. 
 50. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 51. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 392–93.  In Pharmacy, the Court gave 
three justifications for protecting advertising: First, commercial speech is similar to other types of 
protected speech; second, access to advertising promotes an efficient market through cost savings 
that benefit consumers; and third, judgments about how to regulate the market may depend on the 
free flow of information.  Id. at 393. 
 52. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 53. Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 394. 
 54. ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 48, at 116–17. 
 55. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558. 
 56. Id. at 560. 
 57. Id. at 566. 
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Applying the test, Powell wrote that the commission did not state whether the 
activity in question, regarding public utilities, is lawful or misleading.58  The 
state did have a clear and substantial interest in keeping utility rates fair and 
efficient.59  The state’s interest in energy conservation was directly advanced 
by the advertising ban because there was a direct connection between 
advertising and demand for electricity.60  However, the commission failed the 
last prong because it did not demonstrate that its interest in energy 
conservation could not be adequately protected by a less-restrictive method.61  
The commission could, for instance, require the utility to promote the relative 
efficiency of some of its products.62  The Court’s rationale for protecting some, 
but not all, commercial speech is that commercial speech proposes a 
commercial transaction, an area traditionally regulated by the government.63  
Further, advertisers are in a good position to judge the accuracy of their speech 
and its lawfulness.64 
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Central Hudson.65  He wrote that because 
the utility was a monopoly, it deserved more supervision than an ordinary 
corporation.66  He also stated that the fourth prong of the test was misguided 
because it “leaves room for so many hypothetical ‘better’ ways that any 
ingenious lawyer will surely seize on one of them to secure the invalidation of 
what the state agency actually did.”67  A question remaining after Central 
Hudson is one that remains today: whether commercial speech is any less 
protected than other kinds of speech.68 
Two years after Central Hudson, the Court explicitly stated that when 
commercial speech proposes an illegal transaction, the government may 
regulate or entirely ban the speech.69  In that case, Village of Hoffman Estates 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 569. 
 60. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569. 
 61. Id. at 570. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 562.  The Court’s rationale for protecting commercial speech that passes the test 
can be broken into five parts.  ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 48, at 82–83.  Briefly put, the Court 
first stated that commercial speech should be protected because it is in society’s interest to have 
the fullest possible sharing of information.  Id. at 82.  Second, the Court rejected the “highly 
paternalistic view” that the government can suppress all commercial speech.  Id. at 83.  Third, 
people will perceive their own best interest if they are fully informed, and open channels of 
communication promote that.  Id.  Fourth, even though advertising gives only one side of the 
facts, this is better than nothing.  Id.  And fifth, the protection for commercial speech is based on 
the informational function of advertising.  Id. 
 64. ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 48, at 82 (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6). 
 65. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 583. 
 66. Id. at 587; see Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 395. 
 67. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 599–600. 
 68. Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 395–96. 
 69. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982). 
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v. Flipside, the Court upheld an ordinance regulating the sale of drug-related 
goods and literature.70  The Court stated that the only speech interest 
implicated was the display of the merchandise.71  In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,72 the Court held that it was not a 
violation of free speech to prohibit a newspaper from running employment 
advertisements in separate columns for men and women, because that type of 
sex discrimination is an illegal activity.73 
Six years after Central Hudson was decided, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote 
the majority opinion in a decision that directly addressed gambling 
advertisements.  In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of 
Puerto Rico,74 the appellant operated a legal casino in Puerto Rico.75  It was 
illegal to advertise or otherwise offer gambling facilities to the public of Puerto 
Rico.76  The appellant had been fined twice for breaking the advertising 
restriction and sought a declaratory judgment that the statute prohibiting casino 
advertising violated the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the 
Equal Protection Clause.77  The Court said that because the speech did no more 
than propose a commercial transaction, the Central Hudson test should be 
applied.78  Rehnquist found that the activity was not illegal, misleading, or 
fraudulent in the abstract.79  The state did have a substantial interest in 
reducing the demand for gambling among the territory’s residents,80 the 
government interest was directly advanced by the speech restriction, and the 
statute against advertising was no more restrictive than necessary.81  
Significantly, Rehnquist stated that because the Puerto Rico Legislature could 
have completely banned casino gambling, it therefore had the power to ban 
advertisement of casino gambling.82  Rehnquist wrote: 
 
 70. Id. at 495–97. 
 71. Id. at 496. 
 72. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
 73. Id. at  391. 
 74. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
 75. Id. at 333. 
 76. Id. at 332.  It was permitted to advertise to tourists.  Id. at 332–33. 
 77. Id. at 333–34. 
 78. Id. at 340. 
 79. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340–41. 
 80. Id. at 341.  The Tourism Company, which was charged with administering the statute on 
gambling advertisement prohibition, stated: 
Excessive casino gambling among local residents . . . would produce serious harmful 
effects on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the 
disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of 
prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime. 
Id. 
 81. Id. at 342–43. 
 82. Id. at 345–46; see Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 396. 
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[I]t would be a . . . strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the 
legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the 
legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or 
activity through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such 
increased demand.83 
The Posadas decision has been criticized; one gambling law expert, I. Nelson 
Rose, said that it “warped the First Amendment.”84 
The Court observed, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New 
York  v. Fox,85 that none of its past invalidation of government regulation of 
commercial speech involved rules that only “marginally” failed the fourth 
prong of the Central Hudson test.86  “[A]lmost all of the restrictions disallowed 
under Central Hudson’s fourth prong have been substantially excessive, 
disregarding ‘far less restrictive and more precise means,’” Justice Scalia 
stated for the Court.87  On the other hand, when the Court upholds speech 
restrictions under the test, it does not first have to be satisfied that the 
government is employing the least restrictive means.88  The restriction in 
question in Fox was a university rule against selling commercial goods at 
university facilities.89  The Court ultimately decided that the claim was not ripe 
for resolution.90  The Court stated that to pass muster under the fourth prong of 
the Central Hudson test, there must be a reasonable “fit” between the 
legislature’s ends and the means by which those ends are to be accomplished.91  
The means, in other words, must be “narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective.  Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decision makers to 
judge what manner of regulation may be best employed.”92  The Court thus 
declared that the fit does not need to be perfect or the single best way to 
prevent the stated harm, but it should not be totally disproportionate to the 
harm, either. 
Ten years after Posadas, the Court decided 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island.93  The decision “formally repudiated” Posadas.94  A liquor retailer had 
 
 83. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346. 
 84. I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: Understanding the Law of Internet Gambling, in 
89 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 177, 179 (2001).  Rose writes that the Court’s 
holding “is like saying that if a state may punish murder with the death penalty it can also punish 
murder with anything short of the death penalty, such as torture.”  Id. 
 85. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 86. Id. at 479. 
 87. Id. (quoting Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 471–72. 
 90. Fox, 492 U.S. at 485–86. 
 91. Id. at 480 (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 
328, 341 (1986)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
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brought a declaratory action challenging, on First Amendment grounds, a 
Rhode Island law prohibiting the advertisement of liquor prices. 95  Justice 
Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that the First Amendment calls for 
skepticism of any regulation that seeks “to keep people in the dark for what the 
government perceives to be their own good.”96  He concluded that the Court in 
Posadas got the First Amendment analysis wrong.97  The Court in Posadas 
should not have ruled that because the legislature may ban the conduct, it may 
ban speech about the conduct.98  The Constitution, Stevens wrote, “presumes 
that attempts to regulate speech are actually more dangerous than attempts to 
regulate conduct.”99  He continued, “[S]peech restrictions cannot be treated as 
simply another means that the government may use to achieve its ends.”100 
In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States,101 the Court 
again faced the issue of gambling advertisements.  The case concerned the 
Communications Act of 1934,102 which prohibits radio and television 
broadcast of advertisements for privately operated casinos or lotteries.103  
Louisiana broadcasters sought a declaratory judgment that the ban amounted to 
a free speech violation and also sought an injunction preventing enforcement 
of the statute.104  Applying Central Hudson, the Court found that the conduct 
was legal and not misleading.105  Justice Stevens wrote that while the 
government interest in lessening social ills associated with gambling is 
substantial, the federal policy of discouraging gambling is “decidedly 
equivocal,” because Congress has also passed pro-gaming laws, such as those 
relating to tribal gambling.106  Further, the social costs of gambling are offset 
and sometimes outweighed by economic benefits.107  As for the third prong of 
the test, the restriction was found not to materially advance the government’s 
goals.108  The advertisements could be seen merely to channel a gambler from 
one casino to another, not to encourage more gambling.109  Additionally, 
Congress was simultaneously encouraging tribal casino gambling, which could 
 
 94. Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 397. 
 95. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 492–93. 
 96. Id. at 503. 
 97. Id. at 509. 
 98. Id. at 510. 
 99. Id. at 512. 
 100. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 512. 
 101. 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
 102. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (2000). 
 103. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 177. 
 104. Id. at 181. 
 105. Id. at 184–85. 
 106. Id. at 186–87. 
 107. Id. at 186. 
 108. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 188. 
 109. Id. at 189. 
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also increase problem gaming.110  The Court held the government failed to 
specifically connect private casino gambling with gambling addiction via 
broadcast advertisements.111  Last, the Court found that it did not matter 
whether the restriction is more than what is necessary to advance the 
government’s interest, because section 1304 of the Communications Act is “so 
pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to 
exonerate it.”112  The Act contained exemptions for almost every sub-group of 
gambling.113 
In recent years, some members of the Court have expressed doubt about 
the Central Hudson test and when it should be applied.114  One commentator 
stated that the level of First Amendment protection for advertising seems to be 
rising and that some day it could be entitled to the highest sort of constitutional 
protection.115  In some of the commercial speech cases from the last decade, 
members of the Court have dissented to state their dissatisfaction with the 
Central Hudson test.  In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,116 Justice Kennedy 
stated concern in his concurrence that the test gives “insufficient protection to 
truthful, non-misleading commercial speech” and that all government restraint 
of truthful speech should be analyzed under the strict scrutiny test.117  In 44 
Liquormart, Justice Scalia expressed “discomfort” about the test, but wrote 
that the Court does not have the “wherewithal” to replace it.118  Justice Thomas 
concurred in that case, declaring that when the government’s asserted interest 
is to withhold information from legal users of a product or service, the Central 
Hudson test should not be applied.119  While Central Hudson is the test that is 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 190.  Additionally, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, the Court 
struck down a prohibition on advertising of compounded drugs.  535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002).  The 
Court ruled that speech prohibitions must be the government’s last resort: “If the First 
Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort.”  
Id. at 373. 
 113. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190.  Gambling sub-groups could include lotteries, 
horse racing, greyhound racing, legal bookmaking, and gambling on Indian reservations.  See 
Christiansen, supra note 19, at 39 tbl.1. 
 114. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367. 
 115. Ledewitz, supra note 43, at 395, 398. 
 116. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 117. Id. at 571–72 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 118. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517–18 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 119. Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in Parts I, II, VI, and VII, and concurring in the 
judgment).  Thomas wrote: “[T]he Central Hudson test asks the courts to weigh 
incommensurables—the value of knowledge versus the value of ignorance—and to apply 
contradictory premises—that informed adults are the best judges of their own interests, and that 
they are not.”  Id. at 528.  Thomas also stated that the test is difficult to uniformly apply and that 
it leads to a case-by-case balancing test susceptive to individual judicial preference.  Id. at 527.  
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still used by the Court, based on these concurring and dissenting opinions, 
Central Hudson may someday no longer be the test used to weigh First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech.  No member of the Court, 
however, has spoken up in favor of protected commercial speech that 
advertises illegal behavior. 
B. Free Speech and the Internet 
In 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA), which aimed to prevent children from seeing pornography on the 
Internet, violated the First Amendment.120  While this was not a commercial 
speech case, some parts of the opinion are useful to the complaint at hand.  The 
Court noted at the outset that the Internet is a “unique and wholly new medium 
of worldwide human communication.”121  Justice Stevens, author of the 
majority opinion, wrote: “The Web is thus comparable, from the readers’ 
viewpoint, to both a vast library including millions of readily available and 
indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services.”122  
Stevens also expressed the rarity with which one encounters Internet content 
randomly.123  “Unlike communications received by radio or television, ‘the 
receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps 
more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial.’”124  The Court also 
stated that it has often recognized that the government has an interest in 
protecting children from harmful materials.125  However that interest does not 
justify an overbroad restriction of speech that “reduce[s] the adult 
population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.”126 
After the judgment in Reno, Congress passed the Child Online Protection 
Act (COPA), which was meant to achieve the same purpose as the CDA.127  
The Court ultimately struck COPA down as well, stating that less-restrictive 
means are available to protect children from pornography.128  Justice Kennedy, 
 
For another example of disapproval of the Central Hudson test, see the concurrence of Justice 
Stevens in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(referring to the test as “misguided”). 
 120. Reno v. ALCU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).  The Court struck down the CDA in Reno v. 
ACLU because “it was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest and less 
restrictive means were available.”  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004). 
 121. Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 (citation omitted). 
 122. Id. at 853. 
 123. Id. at 854. 
 124. Id. (citation omitted). 
 125. Id. at 875. 
 126. Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 
U.S. 717, 759 (1996)). 
 127. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004). 
 128. Id. at 665.  A less-restrictive method of protecting children from Web porn would be 
installment of filtering software on the family computer.  Id. at 667. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] FIRST AMENDMENT AS LAST RESORT 1303 
writing for the majority, and Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, made a 
few points relevant to the Internet gambling advertising issue.  First, Kennedy 
noted the district court’s finding that forty percent of “harmful-to-minors 
content” comes from overseas, beyond the reach of COPA.129  American 
providers of this content could simply move overseas to avoid COPA.130  
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, wrote that “[g]overnment may not 
penalize speakers for making available to the general World Wide Web 
audience that which the least tolerant communities in America deem unfit for 
their children’s consumption.”131  Stevens also noted that he is uneasy with 
using criminal statutes as a substitute for parental control over children’s Web 
use.132 
III.  APPLICATION OF THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST TO CASINO CITY’S 
COMPLAINT 
The First Amendment applies to speech on the Internet, and laws 
governing traditional advertising also apply to Internet advertising.133  Internet 
gambling itself is not a free speech concern; governments around the world 
treat it as a problem within gambling law rather than within communications 
law.134  In the United States, regulation of gambling is reserved to the states 
through the Tenth Amendment, and there is no constitutional right to 
gamble.135  This unlimited power to prohibit gambling is a contrast to the 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667. 
 131. Id. at 674 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 132. Id. at 675. 
 133. Linda A. Goldstein, Update on Internet Advertising and Promotions, 691 PRACTISING L. 
INST. 1169, 1176 (2002).  Because the United States values free speech, it does not go as far as 
some other countries in controlling Internet content through Internet Service Providers (ISPs).  
Anthony Cabot, Prohibitory Challenges, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 2, at 190. 
 134. Rose, supra note 84, at 178–79.  U.S. federal courts have ruled that gambling is a 
commercial act and is therefore not subject to First Amendment protection as pure speech.  
NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-12. 
 135. Rose, supra note 84, at 180 (citing State v. Rosenthal, 559 P.2d 830, 836 (1977)).  
Gambling has traditionally been seen as a moral issue over which states can use their police 
power.  Id. at 183.  In the United States, gambling regulations are supported by federal law that 
prevents undermining of state law by interstate and foreign commerce.  GAO REPORT, supra note 
3, at 12.  State governments undertake most enforcement of gambling laws, but enforcing these 
laws on the Internet will “become an insurmountable problem for state governments because they 
lack funding, technical capabilities, and the legal authority.”  Anthony Cabot, Study Materials for 
Internet Gaming: Domestic and International Developments, 81 A.L.I-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 
MATERIALS 179, 184 (2000).  States recognize this, and the National Association of Attorneys 
General (NAAG) has asked Congress to pass a law specific to Internet gambling.  Id.; see also 
NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-9 (quoting NAAG committee member James E. Doyle as 
saying that Congress should make Internet gambling illegal: “[S]imply because an activity is 
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freedom of speech, and under 44 Liquormart, does not entitle government to 
ban advertising about gambling simply because it can ban gambling.136  If 
Casino City had been found to have standing, its complaint would probably 
have been analyzed under the Central Hudson test.137  The next few sections 
discuss how Casino City’s complaint would fare under each of the four prongs 
of the test.  The threshold question is whether Casino City’s complaint 
concerns a legal activity. 
A. Prong One: Legal Activity That is Not Misleading 
The first step of the Central Hudson test requires a determination that the 
advertised conduct is legal and not misleading.138  The DOJ interprets federal 
law to prohibit Internet gambling.139  But federal law could be more specific on 
the subject.140  Whether Internet gambling—sports betting or casino games, or 
both—is legal is a crucial question.  If the DOJ is correct that all Internet 
gambling is illegal, Casino City would have no basis to insist that it has a First 
Amendment right to post the advertising.141 
1. Arguments 
Casino City’s complaint alleged that application of federal gambling law 
against it and others similarly situated would violate the First Amendment.142  
The DOJ, in its motion to dismiss, brought up Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.  In that case, the Supreme Court 
held that a newspaper had no constitutional right to run gender-specific help-
wanted advertisements because sex discrimination in employment is illegal.143  
 
difficult to control does not mean law enforcement should be forced to stick its head into the sand 
and act as though the issue does not exist.”). 
 136. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996). 
 137. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980).  See Lawrence G. Walters, Advertising and U.S. Law, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 331, for additional discussion of advertising of Internet gambling. 
 138. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 139. The DOJ takes the position that any activity that is illegal offline is illegal online.  Rose, 
supra note 84, at 194; see NAB Letter, supra note 11. 
 140. Professor I. Nelson Rose of Whittier Law School has said that it is not clear whether 
federal law aimed at sports betting also applies to other forms of gambling.  Pat King, Legal 
Issues Still Unclear on ‘Net Gaming, LAS VEGAS BUS. PRESS, Oct. 22, 2001, at 3B; see JARVIS 
ET AL., supra note 6, at 563. 
 141. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 
(1976). 
 142. Complaint, supra note 21, at 4.  Casino City urged that the NAB Letter, as well as the 
knowledge that media companies have been subpoenaed regarding Internet gambling advertising, 
creates a fear of prosecution and a chilling effect upon the exercise of free speech.  Id. at 3. 
 143. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 18; Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388–89.  The 
DOJ also noted that in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, in which the Supreme Court held 
that to the extent commercial speech proposes an illegal transaction, the government may regulate 
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The DOJ stated that if Casino City accepts advertisements for Internet 
gambling sites which take bets from U.S. customers, it is advertising illegal 
conduct, and there is no First Amendment right to do that.144  Casino City’s 
reply did not argue that Internet gambling is a legal, non-misleading activity, 
exactly.145  It attempted to make the case that the online gambling 
advertisements which it wanted to run should be legal because they target a 
worldwide audience that includes jurisdictions where Internet gambling is 
legal—that when the medium is the Internet, a country such as the United 
States has no right to ban advertisements for conduct that is illegal within its 
borders, because such advertisements can also be seen by people in other 
countries.146  Casino City stated that the implications for “the Internet and 
technology” are the same in this case as they were in Reno v. ACLU and 
Ashcroft v. ACLU because the “broad global impact . . . is of special 
relevance.”147  Also of relevance was the less-invasive nature of the Internet 
compared with radio and television; the Internet requires affirmative steps to 
access.148  The Internet, argued Casino City, creates new First Amendment 
challenges, and “the DOJ cannot assert that the advertisements placed by 
Casino City concern per se illegal conduct,” because of the medium’s 
worldwide audience.149  Further, Casino City argued that its claim is more 
compelling than that of the gambling advertisers in Greater New Orleans, 
because the speech is directed via Internet toward the entire world.150  Last, 
Casino City brought up a recent Second Circuit decision about Internet 
 
the speech or ban it entirely.  DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 18–19; Village of 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982). 
 144. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 19 n.7 (stating that “if Casino City is running 
advertisements for [Internet gambling operations that accept bets from U.S. customers], Casino 
City is advertising illegal activity, and such advertisements are unprotected by the First 
Amendment regardless of Casino City’s liability under 18 U.S.C. §2 [the aiding and abetting 
statute]”). 
 145. See generally Casino City Response, supra note 34. 
 146. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 18–23.  Casino City stated that it offers 
“advertisements for online sports books and casinos on its portals, once there the advertisements 
are available for viewing by tens of millions of people making up the worldwide audience of the 
Internet, many of whom are located in countries where engaging in the conduct that is advertised 
is expressly legal.”  Id. at 21–22.  One country where Internet gambling is legal is Antigua, which 
in November 2004 won a World Trade Organization Panel ruling that U.S. policies against 
Internet gambling disagree with the terms of the General Agreement on Trade Services.  See id. at 
19 n.8; Matt Richtel, U.S. To Appeal W.T.O Ruling that Favored Internet Gambling, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 8, 2005, at C4. 
 147. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 19. 
 148. Id. at 20. 
 149. Id. at 21.  In a footnote, Casino City referenced cases stating that the adult population 
should not necessarily be restricted to reading only what is “fit for children.”  Id. at 21 n.11 
(citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001)). 
 150. Id. at 22. 
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advertising, Swedenburg v. Kelly,151 in which the court struck down a New 
York law that prohibited unlicensed wine dealers from advertising or soliciting 
sales for alcoholic beverages, regardless of whether the purchase was to be 
made in the state or not.152  In Swedenburg, the Court ruled it was a violation 
of the First Amendment for New York to declare that wineries couldn’t 
advertise on the Internet and include order forms that are legal in their own 
states.153 
The DOJ replied that Casino City’s arguments had no merit, stating: 
“Because it is illegal for plaintiff’s customers to operate anywhere in this 
country, plaintiff’s Internet theory is grounded before it can even take 
flight.”154  Casino City, it pointed out, had no legal support for the notion that 
because an activity is legal somewhere in the world, advertisement of that 
activity should be allowed in the United States under Central Hudson.155  
“[That] these criminal businesses may be operating legally in other 
countries . . . in no way mitigates the seriousness of such violations . . . .”156  
Further, the overbreadth doctrine as applied to sexually explicit speech does 
not apply to commercial speech; thus, a ban on advertisement of online 
gambling in jurisdictions where it is legal cannot chill the same advertisements 
in jurisdictions where it is legal.157  Finally, the DOJ argued that Casino City 
relied, in error, on cases that concern speech which cannot be banned in any 
jurisdiction—such as the indecent material that is the subject of Reno v. ACLU 
and Ashcroft v. ACLU.158  
2. Analysis 
The DOJ and Casino City made different types of arguments under the first 
prong of the Central Hudson test.  The DOJ made a traditional argument based 
on statutes and precedent.  Casino City seemed to be arguing that the illegality 
threshold of the Central Hudson test should be reconsidered for Internet 
 
 151. 358 F.3d 223, 240 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 152. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 22–23; Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 240. 
 153. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 241. 
 154. DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at 9. 
 155. Id. at 9. 
Casino City appears to suggest that activity advertised via the Internet should not be 
deemed illegal under the first prong of Central Hudson if it is legal anywhere in the 
world.  It identifies no support in any judicial decision, however, for a rule that would 
allow the world’s most permissive legal regime to influence in any way the ability of this 
country to enforce its laws. 
Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 10 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 670 (1994)). 
 158. DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at 11.  The DOJ also noted that in Reno v. ACLU, the 
Supreme Court “strongly suggested” that it would be possible to entirely ban transmission of 
obscenity.  Id. 
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advertising, because the content will be seen in a variety of jurisdictions with 
varying laws about Internet gambling.159 
The DOJ stated, both in its pleadings and in its letter to the NAB, that 
Internet gambling is illegal in the United States.160  However, as the following 
statutes and cases show, it is possible to make the case that, at least as far as 
Fifth Circuit precedent is concerned, the legality of Internet casino games—as 
opposed to sports betting—is open to differing interpretations.161 
The Wire Act is the most commonly used law in Internet gambling 
prosecutions.162  The Wire Act makes it illegal for a person or company 
engaged in the business of betting to use a “wire communication facility” to 
transmit bets or information assisting in the placing of bets across state lines.163  
Accepting or arranging bets for a fee usually amounts to being in the business 
of betting, and the Wire Act does not apply to the casual bettor who is not in 
the business.164  The Act was passed in 1961, obviously before the existence of 
the Internet, and the technology to which it refers—a “wire communication 
facility”—means “a system that is used to transmit writings, pictures and 
sounds ‘by and of a wire, cable or other like connection between points of 
origin and reception of such transmission.’”165  Current interpretation of the 
Wire Act is that, despite its reference to wires, it applies to Internet 
communication.166  Many people access the Internet through telephone lines, 
and even if a consumer is placing a bet using a wireless Internet connection, 
 
 159. “Because the Net is global, the ads on Casino City may be viewed by anyone, including 
people in countries where online gambling is legal.”  Ante, supra note 21, at 82. 
 160. See NAB Letter, supra note 11.  Additionally, the DOJ wrote an opinion letter to the 
Nevada Gaming Control Board stating that Internet gambling is illegal according to current 
federal law.  The letter also stated that the DOJ considers the actual gambling activity to occur 
both in the jurisdiction of the gambler and that of the gambling company.  Gregory Manter, The 
Pending Determination of the Legality of Internet Gambling in the United States, 2003 DUKE L. 
& TECH. REV. 16, 10. 
 161. Casino City and its lawyers told BusinessWeek that only sports betting is illegal online, 
and that casino games and bingo are still permitted.  Ante, supra note 21, at 82. 
 162. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-6.  See Joseph Kelly et al., U.S. Policy, in INTERNET 
GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 2, at 257, for additional information and background on the Wire 
Act and other federal gambling laws. 
 163. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).  The elements of the Wire Act that the government must 
establish to prove its violation are: 1) that an entity is in the business of betting; 2) the entity is 
knowingly transmitting bets or information assisting in the placement of bets through a wire 
communication facility; 3) the bets are being transmitted in interstate or foreign commerce; and 
4) that the betting business or bettors receive money or credit resulting from the bets.  Seth 
Gorman & Antony Loo, Blackjack or Bust: Can U.S. Law Stop Internet Gambling?, 16 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L. J. 667, 671 (1996).  See generally Cabot, supra note 133, at 187. 
 164. Cabot, supra note 133, at 188.  Some gambling from home on the Internet is not likely to 
face liability under the act.  Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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showing that part of the transmission occurred via a cable or wire would place 
the bet within the Wire Act.167  The General Accounting Office (GAO), in its 
study of Internet Gambling, noted that while all Internet communication 
currently requires some type of telephone or data line, “future Internet 
communications may no longer be wire communications covered under the 
Wire Act.”168  The GAO also stated that the language “transmission of a wire 
communication” is ambiguous because some courts have held that 
“transmission” means only sending information, not receiving it.169 
A major point of contention is whether the Wire Act applies to casino 
games and lotteries.170  The statute refers to bets or wagers “on any sporting 
event or contest.”171  As gaming lawyer Anthony Cabot notes: “In 1961, the 
notion that persons could use the telephone to wager on anything but sporting 
events or horse racing was unrealistic.  Thus, the bill drafters prohibited only 
the transmission of bets or wagers on sporting events or contests.”172  Cabot 
sees a strong argument that the Wire Act does not apply to casino games 
because the word “sporting” appears to apply to both “event” and “contest.”173  
Further, the legislative history of the Wire Act suggests an intent to affect 
sports betting.174  Courts have interpreted the language as both including and 
excluding communication relating to casino games.175 
In addition to the Wire Act, the DOJ also stated that the Travel Act and the 
Illegal Gambling Business Act could be applied to media companies via the 
aiding and abetting statute.176  The Travel Act, which, like the Wire Act, was 
 
 167. Id.  Further, the statute does not limit the type of “wire” used, so that computer data lines 
probably fall within the Act.  “[A]s long as the communication signal traverses a wire at some 
point on its journey from the sender to the receiver, the Wire Act becomes applicable.”  Jonathan 
Gottfried, The Federal Framework for Internet Gambling, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 26, 49 (2004). 
 168. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. 
 169. Id. at 12–13. 
 170. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-7 (stating that the Act “lacks clear definition of 
‘contest’”). 
 171. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000). 
 172. Cabot, supra note 133, at 188.  Some gaming experts believe it is “generally accepted” 
that § 1084 does not apply to casino games.  Cory Aronovitz & Mark D. Schopper, U.S. Case 
Law, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 2, at 305, 305. 
 173. Cabot, supra note 133, at 189. 
 174. Id. 
 175. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 12; Walters, supra, note 137, at 344.  One example of a 
court interpreting the Wire Act as prohibiting Internet casino gambling is Vacco v. World 
Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1999), in which the Supreme 
Court of New York County held that the Wire Act, Travel Act, and Paraphernalia Act all 
prohibited the defendant’s offshore casino.  Id. 
 176. NAB Letter, supra note 11.  Gaming law experts state that the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act and the Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act could 
apply to Internet gambling.  Gottfried, supra note 167, at 51.  The Interstate Transportation of 
Wagering Paraphernalia Act prohibits knowingly carrying or sending in interstate or foreign 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] FIRST AMENDMENT AS LAST RESORT 1309 
intended to fight organized crime, outlaws travel or use of facilities in 
interstate or foreign commerce to conduct a business involving gambling that 
is illegal under state or federal law.177  The Act encompasses transport of items 
as well as telephone lines carrying gambling information.178  This law is 
relatively untested in federal courts, but may relate to a bigger section of the 
Internet gambling industry than the Wire Act does because it is not specific to 
sports betting.179  It has been applied in New York to an online casino that took 
bets from New Yorkers.180 
The Illegal Gambling Business Act states that operation of an illegal 
gambling business under state law is also an offense under federal law.181  An 
illegal gambling business is one that involves five or more people who 
“conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own all or part of such 
business” and “has been or remains in substantially continuous operation” for 
more than thirty days or has gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.182  This 
law has not yet been used to prosecute an Internet gambling enterprise, 
although it is “a likely candidate for future use.”183  However, because the law 
is predicated on violation of an applicable state or federal law, it would require 
that the Internet casino operator be prosecuted under a state or federal law for 
Internet gambling offenses.184 
For the purposes of this scenario, a significant case that interprets the Wire 
Act as only applying to sports betting is In re MasterCard International Inc.185  
This case was decided in the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, in the same circuit where Casino City’s complaint was filed.  The 
plaintiffs had used credit cards to gamble online, and they filed a class-action 
lawsuit against MasterCard and Visa stating that they would not have gambled 
online had their credit cards not been accepted by the Internet casinos.186  The 
plaintiffs brought RICO allegations against the defendant credit card 
companies, stating that the defendants were engaged in a worldwide gambling 
 
commerce any paraphernalia or device to be used in illegal gambling activities.  Id.  The 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act makes it illegal for states and tribes to offer 
betting on sporting events, but it has a grandfather clause for states that already allow sports 
betting.  Wendy J. Johnson, Trial Gaming Expansion in Oregon, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 399, 
426 (2001). 
 177. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000). 
 178. I. Nelson Rose, Internet Gambling: Statutes and International Law, 81 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 233, 245 (2000). 
 179. Gottfried, supra note 167, at 52. 
 180. Id. (citing Vacco, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 851). 
 181. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000); see Rose, supra note 178, at 244. 
 182. 18 U.S.C. § 1955. 
 183. Gottfried, supra note 167, at 53. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Aronovitz & Schopper, supra note 172, at 319. 
 186. In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 474–75 (E.D. La. 2001). 
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enterprise through racketeering activity and collection of unlawful debt.187  In 
granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court held that the Wire Act 
only applies to sports betting.188  The court stated: 
Since plaintiffs have failed to allege that they engaged in sports gambling, and 
internet gambling in connection with activities other than sports betting is not 
illegal under federal law, plaintiffs have no cause of action against the credit 
card companies or the banks under the Wire Act.189 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision, stating 
that “the Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports internet gambling.”190  Casino 
City’s complaint, it should be noted, refers to chilled speech concerning 
advertisements for both casino gambling and sports betting.191 
There are, however, instances in which courts have decided that both 
Internet casino gambling and sports betting violate federal law.  In a New York 
state case, Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., the attorney general of 
New York sought to enjoin an Internet gambling company based in Antigua 
from offering its services to the state’s residents.192  The court ruled that the 
Internet gambling company violated the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the 
Paraphernalia Act.193  The court did not limit the scope of the Wire Act to 
casino games.194  The court stated that “[t]he Internet site creates a virtual 
casino within the user’s computer terminal,” and therefore “[b]y hosting this 
casino and exchanging betting information with the user, an illegal 
communication in violation of the Wire Act and the Travel Act has 
occurred.”195 
Some gambling experts, after In re MasterCard, believe that a change in 
federal law is now required for the DOJ to enforce the Wire Act against 
Internet gambling companies for offering games of chance or skill—casino 
games.196  The DOJ strongly disagreed with the result of In re MasterCard197 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 480. 
 189. Id. at 481 (footnotes omitted). 
 190. In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002).  While this interpretation 
of the Wire Act is binding in the Fifth Circuit, it does not necessarily mean that Internet casinos 
are legal in those states.  Aronovitz & Schopper, supra note 172, at 320.  The tone of the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision is that online gamblers cannot escape credit card debt from Internet casinos—in 
accruing such debt, they “got what they bargained for.”  Id. at 321. 
 191. Complaint, supra note 21, at 2. 
 192. 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847–48 (N.Y. 1999). 
 193. Id. at 851.  “[T]he Wire Act, Travel Act and Paraphernalia Act all apply despite the fact 
that the betting instructions are transmitted from outside the United States over the Internet.  The 
scope of these statutes clearly extends to the transmission of betting information to a foreign 
country . . . .”  Id. 
 194. Id. at 852. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Aronovitz & Schopper, supra note 172, at 319–20. 
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but conceded that the decision “is binding in this circuit.”198  Therefore, a court 
would probably find that advertising Internet sports betting is an illegal activity 
and that Internet casino advertising is not.  In other words, a company like 
Casino City could legally run the Internet casino advertisements, but not 
Internet sports betting advertisements. 
That Casino City posts advertising on the Internet as opposed to some 
other medium does not change the final result.  Casino City’s argument that its 
advertisements are aimed at a worldwide, Internet audience and should 
therefore be protected is ultimately unconvincing.  Two of the cases on which 
Casino City relies—Reno and Ashcroft—dealt with statutes concerning 
obscene and indecent speech that may be constitutionally prohibited towards 
minors, but not towards adults absent certain circumstances.199  It is within the 
context of prohibition of obscene speech that the Court in Reno made its 
statements about the Internet being a “vast platform from which to address and 
hear from a worldwide audience.”200  In those cases, the statutes at issue, 
COPA and the CDA, were struck down because of other issues, such as 
ambiguity and the availability of less-restrictive alternatives.201  Reno, in fact, 
has been called “a relatively narrow decision [that] did little to establish the 
First Amendment parameters of the Internet.”202  Casino City is concerned 
with commercial speech, and under Pittsburgh Press, any commercial speech 
about illegal activity may be prohibited.203  Therefore, Casino City’s complaint 
is distinguishable from Reno and Ashcroft because it deals with a type of 
speech that may constitutionally be denied to all parts of the population 
without regard to age. 
 
This is the first time a federal court has expressly determined that section 1084 is 
restricted to wagering on sporting events or contests. . . . [I]t appears rather certain that 
federal law enforcement will not be able to prosecute Internet casinos under the strictures 
of the Wire Act for offering games of chance and skill. 
Id. 
 197. DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at n.8. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864–65 (1997).  As Justice Stevens noted in his majority 
opinion in Reno, the government may prohibit selling to material to people under age seventeen 
on grounds that the material is “obscene as to them, even if it is not obscene as to adults.”  Id. at 
864. 
 200. Id. at 853. 
 201. Id. at 874 (applying the CDA); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2791–92 (2004) 
(applying COPA). 
 202. Todd G. Hartman, The Marketplace vs. the Ideas: The First Amendment Challenges to 
Internet Commerce, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 426 (1999). 
 203. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 
(1973). 
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Swedenburg v. Kelly,204 another case on which Casino City relied, is also 
distinguishable.  There, the court ruled that New York’s statute was too broad 
because it encompassed some protected speech, such as legal advertising in 
other states.205  Here, however, commercial speech about Internet sports 
betting is, under the Wire Act, illegal in every state.  Casino City seems to 
have argued on behalf of the rights of people in other countries to see its ads.  
Jack M. Balkin, a law professor who was interviewed by BusinessWeek about 
the Casino City complaint, indicated that U.S. courts are not interested in 
giving First Amendment protection to “[w]eb surfers beyond [the United 
States’s] borders.”206  It is entirely possible for a resident of Amsterdam to 
subscribe to The New York Times, yet no one would expect that newspaper to 
advertise products that are legal in the Netherlands but illegal in the United 
States.  Further, when Casino City states that its advertisements are intended 
for a worldwide audience, that statement should be read with an implied wink.  
Practically speaking, Americans make up an estimated 50 to 70 percent of the 
Internet gambling customer base.207  A main purpose of marketing Internet 
gambling is to attract Americans’ attention.208  The Internet is a new area of 
First Amendment law, but it seems unlikely that courts will overlook the 
illegality threshold of the Central Hudson test to allow Casino City to run 
advertising for Internet sports betting. 
B. Prong Two: Substantial State Interest 
Should Casino City succeed on the threshold question of the legality of 
Internet gambling, the court would consider the remainder of the Central 
Hudson test, including whether the government’s interest in prohibiting the 
 
 204. 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 205. Swedenberg, 358 F.3d at 240–41. 
While the state can limit illegal sales of alcohol, section 102(1)(a) broadly encompasses 
protected speech. . . . [I]f plaintiff-appellees’ wineries advertised on the Internet and 
included an order form that is lawful in their own states, the advertisement would be 
illegal in New York, even if it contained language limiting sales to states in which such 
orders were lawful. 
Id. 
 206. Ante, supra note 21, at 84. 
 207. Parke & Griffiths, supra note 44, at 295. 
 208. For example: 
United States citizens currently play a major role in supporting the Internet gambling 
industry . . . . In 1999, the United States players made up nearly 80 percent of Internet 
players.  One Australian Internet gambling operator estimated that 98 percent of its 
players were persons from the United States. 
Antonia Z. Cowan, The Global Gambling Village: Interstate and Transnational Gambling, 7 
GAMING L. REV. 251, 252 (2003). 
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speech is substantial.209  The government bears the burden of proving its 
substantial interest.210 
1. Arguments 
The Casino City complaint simply stated that the government has no 
substantial interest to justify the DOJ’s imposition on commercial speech in 
this context.211  The DOJ, in its motion to dismiss, argued that the government 
has a substantial interest in enforcing its criminal laws and in reducing aid to 
gambling operations that violate those criminal laws.212  The DOJ pointed to 
three prior First Amendment cases in which the Supreme Court held that the 
state has a substantial interest in reducing gambling through laws that address 
advertisement of gambling.213  Those cases are United States v. Edge 
Broadcasting Co., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association Inc. v. 
United States, and Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of 
Puerto Rico.214 
In Posadas, the Court had “no difficulty” concluding that the Puerto Rico 
Legislature had a substantial interest in banning casino advertisements which 
targeted local residents.215  The Court quoted the Tourism Company’s brief as 
saying that excessive casino gambling among locals would produce serious 
harmful effects on their health, safety, and welfare.216  The Court stated that 
these same concerns are what motivate states to ban gambling entirely.217  In 
Edge, the Court held that the federal government has a substantial interest in 
supporting states that do not want lotteries within their borders, as well as 
those that do permit lotteries, by allowing states to disallow lottery advertising 
on the radio.218 
In Greater New Orleans, the Court wrote that “[n]o one seriously doubts” 
that the federal government may have a substantial interest in reducing the 
social problems that the Solicitor General, in that case, attributed to 
gambling.219  Moreover, the DOJ emphasized that in all three of those cases, 
 
 209. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980). 
 210. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999). 
 211. Complaint, supra note 21, at 4. 
 212. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 19–20. 
 213. Id. at 20. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993). 
 219. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 20 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. 
Ass’n v. United States 527 U.S. 173, 186 (1999)); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. 
at 185–86 (quoting the Solicitor General as stating that gambling is “a regressive tax on for the 
poor” and leads to corruption, organized crime, bribery, narcotics trafficking, economic losses to 
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the advertising in question related to legal gambling—in contrast to Internet 
gambling advertising, which “[w]ith very few exceptions limited to licensed 
sportsbook operations in Nevada,” is prohibited by state and federal law.220 
The DOJ rounded out its argument on the subject of substantial interest by 
noting that Internet gambling is “particularly pernicious” because it can be 
accessed easily by anyone, even children and compulsive gamblers.221  
Additionally, there is “potential for fraud and money laundering.”222  The DOJ 
quoted title 14, section 90 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, which prohibits 
gambling by computer.  This statute notes in its introductory section that the 
state legislature is responsible for protecting its citizens, especially children 
and those with an addiction to gambling, from the increased availability of 
gambling services.223 
In Casino City’s response to the DOJ’s motion to dismiss, it argued that 
the three cases relied on by the DOJ under the “substantial interest” prong were 
further along in their proceedings than the present litigation, and were being 
reviewed after summary judgment, or other relief, was either granted or 
denied.224  Casino City also argues that in Greater New Orleans, while the 
Court did find a substantial state interest in regulating gambling advertising, it 
held that finding was “by no means self-evident.”225  In that decision, the Court 
also noted that sometimes the social ills caused by gambling are offset by 
economic benefits.226  In this litigation, Casino City argued, “It is just too early 
to determine that such interests are self-evident.”227  Casino City also noted 
that the Louisiana computer gambling statute provides that advertising 
computer gambling does not violate the statute against computer gambling in 
Louisiana.228 
 
gamblers, their families, communities, and government as well as street, white-collar, and 
organized crime). 
 220. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 20–21 (quoting NAB Letter, supra note 11). 
 221. Id. at 21. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id.; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3 (2004). 
 224. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 23. 
 225. Id. at 23–24 (quoting Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 186). 
 226. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 24. 
 227. Id.  In the DOJ’s Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, which was 
filed after Casino City’s response, the DOJ reiterated that the Supreme Court on three separate 
occasions has found that there is a substantial interest in reducing even legal gambling.  DOJ 
Reply, supra note 38, at 12.  “In any event, whatever the federal government’s interest in 
reducing legal gambling activity, there is no basis for contending that the government lacks a 
substantial interest in enforcing laws proscribing illegal gambling,” the DOJ stated.  Id. 
 228. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 24.  The DOJ, in its Reply Brief, noted that it 
was relying on the Louisiana computer gambling statute because its preamble points out the easy 
accessibility of it.  DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at 13. 
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2. Analysis 
Both precedent and social factors relating to Internet gambling seem to be 
in favor of the DOJ.  First, Greater New Orleans does not seem to point to a 
certain conclusion that a state could potentially not have a substantial interest 
in reducing gambling, so much as it makes the government’s case harder to 
prove.  The Court noted that Congress has declined to adopt a national policy 
against gambling.229  If there is any policy, it is to leave the matter to the 
states.230 
Additionally, Congress has actually allowed the proliferation of new 
gambling opportunities, including sanctioning American Indian gaming and 
enacting statutes that “reflect approval of state legislation” that allows for 
activities like casino gambling and lotteries.231  In a footnote, the Court took a 
survey of legal gambling, and found that some form of it is available in thirty-
seven states and the District of Columbia.232  Today, gambling is legal in all 
but two states—Utah and Hawaii.233  This is what it seems the Court was 
referring to when it stated that federal gambling policy is “decidedly 
equivocal.”234  The federal government, on the other hand, has displayed no 
equivocation when it comes to Internet gambling.  Congress has passed no 
laws allowing states to license and regulate Internet gambling, and no 
agreements have been forged with Native American tribes giving them the 
right to operate gambling Web sites.  The executive branch, through the DOJ, 
interprets federal law to prohibit all Internet gambling.  Only one state, 
Nevada, has passed legislation allowing for the development of regulations of 
Internet gambling.235  However, due to federal gambling laws and the lack of 
an ability to confine online gambling within its borders, Nevada has never 
passed enabling regulations.236  These facts make it seem likely that a court 
could find that the DOJ does have a substantial interest in prohibiting Internet 
gambling and the social ills that are particular to it. 
 
 229. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 187 (1999). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 187. 
 232. Id. at 186 n.5. 
 233. All Bets Are On, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 68.  Thirty-nine U.S. states allow lotteries; 
thirty-four states allow casinos.  Id. 
 234. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 187. 
 235. See Jeff Simpson, Gaming Regulators Seek Legal Advice, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 30, 
2001, at 3D. 
 236. See Terry Lane, Nev. Questions Interstate Internet Gambling Legality, WASH. INTERNET 
DAILY, Mar. 25, 2002, (page number unavailable).  In June 2002, the Nevada legislature passed a 
law that would allow casinos meeting certain requirements to operate Internet gambling Web 
sites.  Id.  Built into the law was a requirement that the Nevada Gaming Control Board could not 
approve any online gambling sites until technology was available to filter out minors, ensure 
fairness of the games, and determine in what state a user is located.  Id. 
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Additionally, the social issues that inevitably come up in any discussion of 
Internet gambling probably justify a substantial interest in reducing or 
prohibiting the advertising of Internet gambling.  Four widely cited problems 
related to Internet gambling are fraud, money laundering, gambling addiction, 
and underage gambling.237 
The potential for fraud is present in Internet gambling because the player 
has little independent assurance that the games are fair or that he will be paid if 
he wins.238  There is also the possibility that unscrupulous Internet gambling 
operators will take advantage of players’ credit card numbers or other sensitive 
information.239  Money laundering is another issue.  An Internet casino could 
aid a money launderer by allowing him or her to deposit money via credit card 
or wire transfer into an account with the casino, gamble with some of the 
money, and then withdraw the money from the account.240  Internet casinos 
operating in jurisdictions that provide only loose or nonexistent regulation may 
not have the same money laundering oversight control as land-based gambling 
operations.241  The GAO Report stated that the FBI believes Internet gambling 
to be a money laundering risk.242  However, the report also stated that banking 
and gaming regulatory officials did not believe Internet gambling to present a 
money laundering risk.243  The CEO of BETonSPORTS.com, David 
Carruthers, called the idea that money could be laundered through Web casinos 
“hogwash.”244  He went further to state, “The very nature of the Internet is that 
every transaction is completely auditable from beginning to end.  Every 
keystroke is logged into our system.  We are more auditable, more 
 
 237. Gottfried, supra note 167, at 15–37. 
 238. Id. at 16.  With sports betting, however, the customer can independently verify the 
outcome of the game and will thus know if he won or lost money.  NGISC REPORT, supra note 
14, at 5-3. 
 239. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-5.  Additionally, computer hackers may be able to 
manipulate games.  Id. 
 240. Gottfried, supra note 167, at 17 (stating that Internet gambling sites could help with the 
“layering” phase of money laundering). 
To launder money, a person need only deposit money into an offshore account, use those 
funds to gamble, lose a small percent of the original funds, then cash out the remaining 
funds.  Through the dual protection of encryption and anonymity, much of this activity 
can take place undetected. 
NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-6. 
 241. See NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-5, for the proposition that “[l]ack of 
accountability also raises the potential for criminal activities, which can occur in several ways.” 
 242. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 35–37.  In 2002 the FBI said it had two open cases 
involving Internet gambling as a vehicle for money laundering, and a Financial Action Task 
Force report in 2001 stated that some of its member jurisdictions had evidence of Internet 
gambling being used to launder money.  Id. at 35–36. 
 243. Id. at 37. 
 244. American Citizens Want to Gamble on the Internet, BUS. WK., Dec. 20, 2004, at 66. 
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scrupulously clean than the land-based operators.”245  It should be pointed out 
that many Internet gambling companies are publicly traded on foreign markets 
and some are also members of the Interactive Gaming Council, a trade 
organization for the industry.246  Clearly, law enforcement and business 
representatives disagree about the potential for money laundering in Internet 
gambling. 
Gambling addiction and underage gambling are also areas of concern.  
Pathological gambling, or gambling addiction, is classified as a disorder by the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV.247  The National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission Report cites a 1997 analysis by the 
Harvard Medical School Division on Addictions as finding that there are about 
125 million Americans who gamble, and of them, 7.5 million are either 
problem or pathological gamblers.248  Mark Griffiths, a professor of gambling 
studies at the International Gaming Research Unit at Nottingham Trent 
University, stated that social environment and the design of the gambling 
activity are factors in determining how people become addicted to gambling.249  
There are a variety of features of Internet gambling that distinguish it from 
traditional gambling.  Most of them seem to weigh against the interests of a 
problem gambler.250  These features include: round-the-clock access, ability to 
gamble during the work day, lower initial wagers, and the greater use of 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. PartyGaming, owner of top poker Web site PartyPoker.com, went public on the London 
Stock Exchange in July of 2005; it was valued at $10 billion.  Peter Gumbel, How the U.S. Is 
Getting Beat in Online Gambling, TIME, Nov. 28, 2005, A1, at A2.  MGM Mirage at one time 
operated an offshore Internet gambling site, but shut the site down because it could not take bets 
from U.S. players and was therefore losing money.  60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Nov. 
20, 2005).  For information on the Interactive Gaming Council, see Interactive Gaming Council, 
About Us, http://www.igcouncil.org/aboutus.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2006). 
 247. Gottfried, supra note 167, at 30–31 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 312.31 (4th ed. 2000)). 
 248. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 4-1.  Pathological gambling is defined, according to 
the American Psychiatric Association in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV), as an impulse control disorder.  Id.  The DSM-IV lists ten criteria used in 
diagnosis, including “repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back or stop gambling” and 
committing “illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft or embezzlement to finance gambling.”  Id.  
A “problem gambler,” by contrast, experiences adverse consequences that fall below the 
threshold of at least five of the ten criteria used to diagnose pathological gambling.  Id. 
 249. Gamblers’ Brains Addiction Clue, BBC News, Jan. 10, 2005, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4154709.stm; see also Gary Rivlin, The Chrome-Shiny, Lights-
Flashing, Wheel-Spinning, Touch-Screened, Drew-Carey-Wisecracking, Video-Playing, ‘Sound 
Events’-Packed, Pulse-Quickening Bandit, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 9, 2004, at 46–47.  Howard 
Shaffer, the director of the Division on Addictions at Harvard Medical School, said that when 
humans are confronted with a situation in which they will be rewarded intermittently, such as 
with a slot machine, they will pursue winning with a “persistent tenacity.  That hard-wiring that 
nature gave us didn’t anticipate electronic gaming devices.”  Id. at 47. 
 250. Cabot, supra note 133, at 182. 
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technology by young people.251  Internet gambling is a concern for groups that 
treat gambling addiction, such as the National Council on Problem 
Gambling.252  Keith Whyte, the group’s executive director, said risks unique to 
online gambling include social isolation and unlimited access.253  For these 
reasons, Internet gambling has been referred to as the “crack cocaine of 
gambling” by legislators who want to ban the activity in the United States.254 
Regarding underage gambling, the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission Report stated that an estimated 7.9 million American adolescents 
have problem or pathological gambling addiction.255  In 1998, two gambling 
addiction researchers at the University of Minnesota, Randy Stinchfield and 
Ken C. Winters, wrote that one possible way to prevent gambling addiction 
among adolescents is for the government and the gambling industry to monitor 
gambling advertisements, which only present the positive side of gambling.256  
“While most adults are able to see through this veneer, many adolescents may 
not be,” they wrote.257  Internet gambling in particular is attractive to 
teenagers, both because most teenagers are Web-savvy, and because many 
Internet gambling sites feature graphics and sound that blur the line between 
gambling and video gaming.258  A recent test by Gamcare, a British group that 
promotes responsible gaming, found that only seven of thirty-seven gambling 
Web sites prevented a 16-year-old from registering to gamble online.259 
For the most part, the same concerns that have been discussed regarding 
Internet gambling were listed by the government in Greater New Orleans as 
reasons for its substantial interest in prohibiting broadcast of casino 
advertisements.260  There, the Supreme Court found a substantial interest, but 
expressed some hesitation about it.  Gambling, the Court stated, sometimes 
 
 251. Id. 
 252. Andrea Orr, Online Poker’s Flush with Success as More Folks Deal Themselves In, 
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 1, 2004, at A04. 
 253. Id. 
 254. House Bid to Curb Internet Gambling Yields Tangled Web of Legislation, ELECTRONIC 
COM. NEWS, June 9, 2003 (page number unavailable) (quoting Rep. Howard Coble as saying, 
“Virtual casinos and their video game structure have been labeled the crack cocaine of 
gambling.”). 
 255. NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 4-1. 
 256. Randy Stinchfield & Ken C. Winters, Gambling and Problem Gambling Among Youths, 
556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 172, 183 (1998). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Jeffrey L. Derevensky et al., Adolescent Problem Gaming: Legislative and Policy 
Decisions, 8 GAMING L. REV. 107, 112 (2004).  Additionally, “[p]roblem and pathological 
gambling amongst adolescents has been shown to result in increased delinquency and crime, the 
disruption of familial relationships and multiple mental health, legal, academic and behavioral 
problems.”  Id. at 109. 
 259. All Bets Are On, supra note 233, at 69. 
 260. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 185 (1999). 
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comes with economic benefits that can balance the costs.261  However, Internet 
gambling doesn’t provide an economic benefit in the United States in the way 
land-based casinos do.262  It provides no jobs for casino and hotel staff and no 
tax dollars for schools and government programs.  All the monetary benefits to 
Internet gambling flow offshore.263  Given the ease with which the Court has in 
the past found a substantial interest in prohibiting speech about gambling, 
combined with the significant possible social detriments associated with 
Internet gambling, it seems likely that the Court could rule in favor of the DOJ 
on the subject of substantial interest. 
C. Prong Three: Direct Advancement of Asserted Interest 
A court must next determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
asserted governmental interest.264  In their pleadings and memoranda, the 
parties did not focus as much attention on this prong as they did on the other 
prongs.265 
1. Arguments 
In its complaint, Casino City stated that the DOJ’s threat to prosecute 
advertisers of Internet gambling on a theory of aiding and abetting liability 
does not directly advance a government interest.266  In its motion to dismiss, 
the DOJ argued that the government interest is directly advanced because the 
DOJ, by “punishing and deterring” such advertising, is reducing the ability of 
gambling Web sites to attract customers.267  In response, Casino City called 
this argument “legally insufficient” in light of the holding in Greater New 
Orleans that to satisfy this element of the test, the government needs to show 
that the harms it recites are real and that the speech restriction will “alleviate 
them to a material degree.”268  Casino City argued that the DOJ has evidence 
of neither a harm nor alleviation of a speculative harm to a material degree.269  
In fact, Web sites not based in the United States are free to carry Internet 
 
 261. Id. 
 262. Gambling attorney Anthony Cabot said the United States is losing about $7 billion per 
year by outlawing Internet gambling.  Gumbel, supra note 246, at A3. 
 263. See Watson et al., supra note 10, at 209.  “Countries that authorize Internet gambling and 
draw financial resources from it have little motivation to enforce U.S. antigambling laws.”  Id. at 
210. 
 264. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980). 
 265. See Complaint, supra note 21; DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29; Casino City 
Response, supra note 34; DOJ Reply, supra note 38. 
 266. Complaint, supra note 21, at 4. 
 267. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 22. 
 268. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 25.  Casino City stated that “[c]onjecture is all 
that the DOJ has to offer” on this prong.  Id. 
 269. Id. 
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gambling advertising that will be accessible to Americans.  Therefore, 
prohibiting online gambling advertising in the United States wouldn’t wholly 
deprive Americans of Internet gambling marketing.270  The DOJ responded by 
pointing out that reducing advertising for an activity will reduce the prevalence 
of the activity itself.271 
2. Analysis 
Taking into account the rather limited amount of information contained in 
the pleadings about direct advancement of the state interest, the DOJ in a 
future case may fail to prove this prong of the Central Hudson test.  According 
to Edenfield v. Fane, the government’s burden to show material alleviation of a 
harm will not be met by “mere speculation or conjecture.”272  In many 
commercial speech cases, if the government loses the case, the “direct 
advancement” element is the element that the government fails to meet.273  In 
Greater New Orleans—a case about broadcast advertising of casinos—the 
Supreme Court didn’t fully buy the government’s argument that an advertising 
ban would directly advance its substantial interest in reducing the social costs 
of gambling.  Justice Stevens wrote: 
Assuming the accuracy of this causal chain, it does not necessarily follow that 
the Government’s speech ban has directly and materially furthered the asserted 
interest. While it is no doubt fair to assume that more advertising would have 
some impact on overall demand for gambling, it is also reasonable to assume 
that much of that advertising would merely channel gamblers to one casino 
rather than another.274 
Additionally, Stevens pointed out that the effectiveness of the ban must be 
considered in light of the fact that the federal government was simultaneously 
encouraging tribal casino gambling.275 
 
 270. Id. at 25–26 (stating that “[b]anning U.S. portals from carrying Internet gaming 
advertisements does little if anything to remove the advertisements from the Internet as foreign 
based portals will continue to carry them unabated”). 
 271. DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at 13 (“[T]he connection between advertising an activity and 
increased incidence of the activity is the very reason that Internet gambling businesses pay Casino 
City to advertise for them . . . .”). 
 272. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993). 
 273. ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 48, at 120–21. 
[P]ractically all of the state restrictions on commercial speech which the Supreme Court 
has invalidated have been voided not on the ground that the state interest was 
insufficiently important or substantial but because the means selected to advance that 
interest was not directly related to the governmental interest, even if it were assumed that 
the state interest had qualified as a substantial one. 
Id. 
 274. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 189 (1999). 
 275. Id. 
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Here, it seems difficult to assume that the DOJ crackdown on advertising 
subsequent to the NAB letter in 2003 has either stemmed the appetite for 
Internet gambling among Americans or materially furthered the government’s 
interest in reducing illegal gambling.  In fact, it seems that the popularity of 
Internet gambling is only growing.276  In 2003, $10 million was spent on 
Internet gambling advertising; in 2002, it went from 11th to 5th place in 
overall Internet ad impressions.277  PokerRoom.com, which is second in size to 
PartyPoker.com, had a 60 percent increase in business in 2004, and 80 percent 
of its 2.5 million users are in the United States.278  At cardplayerpoker.com, a 
free-play site, “the Internet numbers are doubling every three or four months, 
and have been for several years now.”279  BETonSPORTS.com expected to add 
50,000 new customers to its existing 1.2 million customers by the end of 
2004.280  The publication In Business Las Vegas reported that Internet 
gambling operators are “winning the advertising war” by increasing spending 
“on everything from sponsorships to the kinds of traditional marketing 
campaigns reserved for major product brands.”281  This includes advertising on 
cable television, billboards, and sponsoring a Formula One team in Europe and 
fighters in the Ultimate Fighting Championship.282  Estimates of Internet 
gambling companies’ revenue vary, and it is problematic, given the lack of 
regulation or reporting requirements, to get a firm grasp on whether the efforts 
 
 276. Kathy Kristoff, Online Gambling Makes It Easy to Lose Shirt, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 10, 
2004, at E3 (quoting gambling industry statistician Sebastian Sinclair as saying, “The 
fundamental factor that’s driving this industry is demand. . . . And there is tremendous demand 
that will make Internet gambling difficult to stop.”). 
 277. Richard Williamson, Online Casinos Await Answer from DOJ, ADWEEK, Oct. 18, 2004, 
at 13. 
 278. Orr, supra note 252. 
 279. Poker’s Growing Stakes, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Apr. 8, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/4694939.  The recent growth in popularity of poker has been attributed both to the Internet and 
the cable broadcast of the World Poker Tour.  “Poker is seen as a competition and a sport now, 
not as gambling per se,” said Mike Sexton, a commentator for the World Poker Tour.  Walter 
Kirn & Jeffrey Ressner, Hot Game in Town: Poker’s New Face, TIME, July 26, 2004, at 30. 
 280. Peter John, Betonsports Puts Its Money on Weathering Hurricane Season, FIN. TIMES, 
Oct. 15, 2004, at 23.  The company’s new real-time poker site gained 700 new users within its 
first four hours of operation.  Id.  Likewise, Sportingbet, a U.K. company that offers online sports 
betting, poker, and casino games to a clientele that is 70 percent American, added 76,000 new 
customers in the four-month period ending in July 2004 and will likely have profits of at least £25 
million this year.  Peter Shearlock, Company Spotlight: One Business Makes the Internet a Really 
Safe Bet, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 21, 2004, at 10. 
 281. Liz Benston, Online Casinos Continue Marketing Push, IN BUS. LAS VEGAS, Dec. 17, 
2004, at 15. 
 282. Id.  Online casinos and sports books are also making use of nontraditional marketing.  Id.  
GoldenPalace.com has tried to insert itself into headlines by paying streakers to run through 
sporting events with its name painted on their bodies, and also sponsored a private Canadian team 
trying to build a space craft.  Eli Kintisch, SpaceShipOne Now Has Eye on the Prize, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 2004 at A1. 
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of the DOJ have caused Americans to spend less money on gambling.283  But 
regardless of whether or not Americans are spending less money on Internet 
gambling, the increase in sign-ups at gambling Web sites at least suggests that 
more Americans are learning about the sites and checking them out.284  Much 
like in Greater New Orleans, the ban on advertising doesn’t seem to directly 
advance the DOJ’s interests, because it seems to have done little to reduce the 
interest in Internet gambling among Americans.  Thus, it seems that the DOJ 
has not proven its point, at least according to the pleadings, on this prong of the 
Central Hudson test. 
D. Prong Four: Restriction Not More Extensive than Necessary 
The final prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the government’s 
prohibition of commercial speech be no more extensive than necessary to serve 
the asserted purpose.285  Again, the pleadings are considerably briefer on this 
topic than they are on first two prongs of the Central Hudson test. 
1. Arguments 
Casino City’s complaint stated that the threatened application of federal 
law against companies that advertise Internet gambling “is not narrowly drawn 
to effectuate any purported government interest.”286  The DOJ’s motion to 
dismiss argued that its prohibition on Internet gambling advertisements could 
not be any more narrowly tailored because it only targeted illegal Internet 
gambling that would violate 18 U.S.C. § 2, the aiding and abetting statute.287  
Casino City, in its reply, argued that the DOJ had not provided any evidence 
for its contention, and that although Casino City was not required to do so, it 
should be given an opportunity to show the court alternative measures that 
would achieve the government’s interest less intrusively than the challenged 
 
 283. Internet gambling revenue topped $7 billion in 2004.  Curbing Internet Gambling, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 6, 2005, at 8.  Christian Capital Advisors projects revenue to rise 
to $9.8 billion in 2005.  Id.  By 2018, it predicts yearly revenue of $18.4 billion.  Id.  “Our 
revenues are greater than Yahoo!’s.  Our profits are greater than Amazon’s.  It’s ridiculous,” said 
Alex Czajkowski, marketing director of Sportingbet PLC, a company that had a $39.5 million 
operating profit last fiscal year.  Lorraine Woellert, Can Online Betting Change Its Luck?, BUS. 
WK., Dec. 20, 2004, at 66. 
 284. “At least three factors have lead to the popularity of Internet gambling”: It is anonymous 
and does not require travel; it is a low-cost business to run; and the U.S. public generally accepts 
gambling.  Watson et al., supra note 10, at 209.  For the ever-increasing popularity of Web 
gambling, especially poker, see Gumbel, supra note 246; American Citizens Want to Gamble on 
the Internet, BUS. WK., Dec. 20, 2004, at 67. 
 285. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980). 
 286. Complaint, supra note 21, at 4. 
 287. DOJ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 29, at 22. 
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restriction.288  The DOJ, in response, observed that Casino City did not put 
forth any alternatives in its response to the motion to dismiss.289  Without any 
suggestions from Casino City about how the government could accomplish its 
goal of cutting down on the ability of Internet gambling sites to solicit U.S. 
customers, the DOJ argued that its motion to dismiss should be granted.290 
2. Analysis 
As previously described, the government is not required to employ the 
least restrictive means conceivable; it must, however, make sure that the 
speech restriction is reasonably tailored to promote the asserted interest.291  In 
44 Liquormart, the Court struck down Rhode Island’s law against publishing 
the price of liquor in an advertisement.292  In authoring the majority opinion, 
Justice Stevens found that there were other methods to achieve the state’s 
objective of promoting temperance that did not involve any restriction on 
speech, such as maintenance of high prices through direct regulation or an 
increased alcohol tax.293  Similarly, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,294 the 
Court decided that the government’s substantial interest in suppressing strength 
wars in the beer market did not warrant a ban on beer labels which disclose 
alcohol content.295  The majority opinion expressed that there were a variety of 
regulatory options available, such as directly limiting the alcohol content of 
beer, which did not implicate speech.296 
The DOJ seemed to identify the substantial interests here as enforcement 
of criminal laws and reducing aid to illegal gambling companies, as well as 
reducing gambling by reducing gambling advertising.297  Again, the overall 
question of whether Internet sports betting and casino gambling are legal 
reared its head.  Under the DOJ’s approach, both casino games and betting on 
the Web are deemed illegal.298  Therefore, it would seem that the DOJ’s 
warning against Internet gambling advertising is not simply one of the least 
 
 288. Casino City Response, supra note 34, at 26. 
 289. DOJ Reply, supra note 38, at 14. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (citing 
Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). 
 292. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996). 
 293. Id.  Stevens also suggested that per capita purchases could be limited, such as with 
prescription drugs, or the state could promote an anti-drinking message through educational 
campaigns.  Id. 
 294. 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
 295. Id. at 490–91. 
 296. Id.  “[R]espondent suggests several alternatives . . . . We agree that the availability of all 
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 298. NAB Letter, supra note 11. 
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restrictive means available, but possibly one of a very few means available to 
prevent Internet gambling operators from offering their services to 
Americans.299  To enforce the Wire Act against the Internet gambling industry, 
it seems that prosecutors must go after advertisers and payment processing 
services.300  Under these conditions, a court could find that a speech restriction 
is reasonably tailored to serve the asserted interest.301  However, if a court 
views Internet casino gambling as not expressly illegal under federal law— 
i.e., that federal law only prohibits Internet sports gambling, via the Wire Act 
and the holding in In re MasterCard—restricting advertising about Internet 
casino gambling could be less of a reasonable fit.  In that scenario, it seems 
that the DOJ’s interest in reducing illegal gambling and the social problems 
associated with gambling could be achieved by strict regulation of the Internet 
gambling industry.302  Such regulation could require casino and betting Web 
sites to use identity verification software to keep tabs on who customers are 
and how much they are gambling.  Thus, a court’s ruling on the fourth prong 
may depend on whether it considers both Internet casino gambling and sports 
betting to be an illegal activity. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
If this issue comes before a court again, it is conceivable that a court could 
rule that a company like Casino City may advertise Internet casinos but not 
Internet sports betting Web sites.  Under Fifth Circuit precedent established in 
In re MasterCard, the Wire Act forbids taking sports bets via the Internet, but 
not offering casino gambling via the Internet.303  Therefore, the company 
 
 299. Because many Internet gambling companies are located in offshore jurisdictions, it is 
difficult for the United States to enforce its laws against them.  “To effectively prohibit Internet 
gambling, the U.S. government would have to ensure that these . . . operators do not offer their 
services within U.S. borders, a proposition that poses a range of unanswered questions regarding 
feasibility.”  NGISC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5-10.  One feasibility problem is that it is easy to 
change the address of a Web site, which consists of a chain of numbers, and doing so makes it 
difficult to track the physical location of the company using the Web site.  Id. at 5-11. 
 300. “Companies that do business with offshore-based gambling Web sites have been subject 
to pressure and prosecution from the U.S. government.”  Watson et al., supra note 10, at 210.  
PayPal agreed to pay $10 million to settle the DOJ’s claim that it was violating the Wire Act by 
facilitating Internet gambling transactions.  Id. 
 301. However, if the Court determines that both casino and sports betting on the Internet are 
illegal conduct, under the first prong of Central Hudson, then the government will automatically 
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advertise illegal activity.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
 302. “[Legalization will allow] strict legislative scrutiny of all provisions and enable 
lawmakers to delegate the appropriate authority to those who can enforce the regulations 
effectively.”  Friedrich, supra note 10, at 370. 
 303. In re MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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would not be advertising illegal conduct, under In re MasterCard, if it ran 
online casino advertisements.  However, the government may still restrict 
online casino advertisements if it satisfies the remaining prongs of the Central 
Hudson test.  Under the Central Hudson test, once the legality of the advertised 
conduct has been established, a court must then consider whether the 
government has a substantial interest in prohibiting the commercial speech, 
whether the government’s restriction materially advances the asserted interest, 
and whether the government’s restriction is no more extensive than 
necessary.304  The potential social ills associated with Internet gambling, such 
as gambling addiction and the opportunity for fraud, probably justify the 
DOJ’s substantial interest in restricting Internet gambling advertising.  
However, because of the ever-increasing popularity of Internet gambling, 
especially Internet poker, and because Internet gambling is still being marketed 
to American consumers via methods like sports sponsorships, a court could 
find that the DOJ’s restriction has not materially advanced its interest.  Lastly, 
concerning whether the speech restriction is no more extensive than necessary, 
a court’s decision will probably depend on whether it considers online casino 
gambling a legal activity.  Because Internet gambling operations are based 
offshore, though, it is possible that a court could find that the advertising 
prohibition is the only method for the DOJ to enforce the government interest 
in reduced gambling.  Therefore, assuming that a court determines Internet 
casino gambling to be lawful and that the government’s restriction does not 
materially advance its interest, it is conceivable that a future complainant may 
establish the right to advertise Internet casinos. 
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